We present a model of electoral control with behavioral voters. The model captures two main regularities of voting behavior found in empirical studies: voters are forgetful and are inuenced by extraneous events beyond the control of public ocials (e.g. rain fall). Specically, we assume the voters' propensities to reelect the incumbent is governed by a stochastic reinforcement process instead of strategic reasoning. We study electoral control (i.e. public ocials' incentive exercise eort) in such an environment. We show that even in the context of low-rationality, electoral control of public ocials can work well. However, the extent of control depends on the properties of the election and the electorate. Extraneous events that decrease a voter's propensity to reelect the incumbent benet electoral control, as the incumbent must exert greater eort to ensure reelection. Increasing the benets of holding oce also has a positive eect, while the degree of voter forgetfulness helps electoral control if and only if elections are held frequently. JEL classication: D03, D72, D83
Introduction
The question of electoral control of public ocials is of central concern in political science. Some political theorists, e.g., Riker (1982; 9) following Madison (Federalist 39), have even argued that democracy consists of the control of public ocials and little else. This has led to the question of how well electoral accountability actually works. The formal political science literature 1 has focused on the eect of asymmetric information on electoral control. 2 Some papers, like Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , focus on moral hazard, where the actions ("eort") of the incumbent are unobservable and the electorate chooses a retrospective voting rule to induce high eort from the incumbent. Other approaches, like Rogo (1990) and Ashworth (2005) , consider the case of adverse selection, where the ability of the incumbent is unknown and the electorate needs to screen out low ability incumbents. In a typical model, the electorate and the incumbent interact in a dynamic game, and the prediction is based on Nash Equilibrium. One of the main insights of this literature is that some level of electoral accountability can be maintained under informational asymmetry, albeit at a cost to the voters.
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In such models voters are assumed to be rational. They process information via Bayesian updating and act strategically in a game form that is assumed to be common knowledge.
This approach has been heavily criticized by political scientists who empirically study voting behavior and public opinion. Concerns go back to some of the early studies of voters conducted by the Columbia and Michigan School (e.g. Berelson In his summary of post-war public opinion research, Stimson states (Stimson 2004; p. 13) What those studies found was that ordinary Americans knew almost nothing about public aairs and appeared to care about issues as much as they knew:
almost not at all. Their beliefs were a scattering of unrelated ideas, often mutually contradictory. Structure was nowhere to be found.
1 See Ashworth (2012) for a recent overview. 2 Under perfect information, the voters can trivially achieve complete electoral control by conditioning reelection on the implementation of (voter) welfare maximizing policy. 3 In Rogo (1990) , for example, the voters can distinguish high ability incumbent from low ability incumbent in a separating equilibrium, although the incumbent will implement inationary scal policy, which decreases welfare. 4 These concerns not only apply to models with fully rational voters, but also accounts of "reasoning voters", where voters uses cues, endorsements by trusted parties, media coverage, debate performance etc. to make, while not fully rational, at least competent decisions (e.g. Popkin 1991 , Lupia and McCubbins 1998 , Lau and Redlawsk 2006 . 5 Some external events do allow rational voters to deduce incumbent's performance. For example, voter response will be inuenced by disaster relief eorts (Cole, Healy, and Werker 2011, Healy and Malhotra 2010, Gasper and Reeves 2011). The point is not that the incumbent's performance (on the local economy or other matters of public importance, e.g. disaster management) has no eect on reelection rates, but that rational voters should be able to ignore irrelevant factors, but the evidence suggests that they aren't.
oil (e.g. Michigan and Indiana). In other words, while governors can do little to aect global oil prices, they are still held accountable by the voters.
The failure of rational information ltering is not the only problem faced by rational accounts of economic voting. As Hibbs (2006; p.570) has pointed out, one implication of the principal-agent approach to electoral accountability is that "the electorate should evaluate performance over the incumbent's entire term of oce, with little or no backward time discounting of performance outcomes". In practice, however, much of the empirical economic voting literature has used periods close to the election dates or overweighted recent periods (e.g. Kramer 1971 , Tufte 1978 , Erickson 1989 Hibbs 2000 ; Bartels and Zaller 2001) . Achen and Bartels (2004a) argue that such restrictions are not an accident, but a reection of a fundamental feature of an electorate who systematically ignores, discounts, or simply forgets relevant information that occurred earlier in the term of an elected ocial. Nonetheless, instead of rigorously evaluating the implications of these empirical ndings, much of the existing debate is centered around the interpretation of empirical ndings.
On the one hand, behaviorally oriented researchers take the ndings to be proof of voter irrationality. On the other hand, scholars from the rational choice tradition have either tried to undermine the validity of the evidence or argued that rational choice models of electoral control do a satisfactory job of accounting for the evidence (e.g. Ashworth 2012, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2013a). 8 6 A separate line of argument, originally pointed out by Fearon (1999) , has identied a tension between forward looking selection of good oce-holders and backward looking strategies that maximize incentives for oce-holders to engage in costly eort (Alt, de Mesquita and Rose 2011, Ashworth and de Mesquita 2008, Ashworth, de Mesquita and Friedenberg 2012). The election rule that selects good types may be dierent from the election rule that maximized the oce-holder's incentives to take costly action. Therefore, electoral control can increase if voters disregard some information about incumbents (Ashworth and de Mesquita 2013a). Ashworth and de Mesquita (2013b) show that in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard, a rational retrospective voting rule does not necessarily maximize incentives for eort nor ex ante welfare. This leaves open the possibility that a dierent voting rule (with limited rationality) may induce higher eort welfare. The results in our model are not driven by direct strategic interaction between voters and politicians since voters are non-strategic by denition. Moreover, we set aside issues of incumbent quality and focus exclusively on electoral control as in the original Ferejohn (1986) model. 7 For a discussion of this and related views see Dahl (1989) . 8 In a recent paper Healy and Lenz (2014) provide evidence that the myopia exhibited by voters is based on
In this paper, we take a dierent approach. We shall develop a model that captures behavioral features identied in the empirical behavioralist literature and assess its empirical and normative consequences for electoral control of public ocials. We will, for the sake of the argument, set aside the rational voting model and assume that voters indeed behave according to the behavioral tradition. Specically, our model will capture three main features of voting behavior identied in the empirical studies. 9 1. Voting partially depends on the actions ("eort") of the incumbent, as highlighted in the economic voting literature.
2.
Voting partially depends on extraneous events that are beyond the control of the incumbent.
3. Voters are forgetful. They overweigh their experiences of the recent past in forming their attitudes toward the incumbent.
Our model provides new insights on the relationship between voter sophistication and electoral control. Our result in Section 4.1 shows that extraneous events (e.g. shark attacks, global oil prices) can be dierentiated in terms of their eects on electoral control. This observation comes from recognizing that such events dier in many aspects. For example, events such as natural disasters and shark attacks are found to depress a voter's propensity to reelect the incumbent; such events are thus negative for the incumbent. Other events, such as global oil prices, may either increase or decrease voters' propensities. 10 We nd that positive and negative events have asymmetric eects on electoral control. In particular, electoral control is increasing in the salience of negative events, and decreasing in the salience of positive events. In other words, electoral control is enhanced when voters pay greater attention to negative events. Extraneous events also dier in terms of frequency of occurrence and the degree of correlation among voters. For example, a change in the global oil price has broad economic consequences, and therefore it can have an eect on many voters' sentiments. Results in Section 5.1 suggest that events that occur frequently and aect a the misinterpretation of information by voters, not rational disregard of an incumbent's early performance. They show rst that voters base they voting choices on election year performance alone as suggested by the economic voting literature. But if they are presented with cumulative economic performance over the entire period of incumbency voters use the more comprehensive information instead. 9 For recent experimental results that support these ndings see Huber, Hill, and Lentz (2012). 10 In the case of global oil prices, Wolfers (2007) nds that a rise in prices hurts the incumbent and a drop in prices helps the incumbent large proportion of the electorate have the most pernicious eect on electoral control, while rare, approximately independent events can enhance electoral control.
By using a behavioral approach we can also investigate the impact of cognitive characteristics of voters, such as the degree of forgetfulness, on electoral control (see Section 4.2 and 5.2).
The empirical literature on electoral behavior has argued that incumbents' performances close to the date of the the election have a disproportionately large eect on voters' decisions.
One explanation is that voters have limited memory. We are able to parametrize voter forgetfulness within our model. We nd that the eect of voter forgetfulness depends crucially on the frequency of elections. When elections are frequent, higher level of forgetfulness can be benecial to electoral control. Indeed, when election is held in every period, electoral control is maximized if voters are maximally forgetful, or "satisce" as in Simon (1955) 11 Moreover, unlike many existing adaptive voting models where solutions are obtained numerically, our model can be solved analytically. This is mainly driven by two features: rst, we dispense with endogenous aspiration-levels, and second, we consider a continuum of voters.
The rational electoral control model closest to ours is Ferejohn's (1986) moral hazard model.
As in the Ferejohn (1986), we model politicians as rational forward looking agents whose utility depends on the value of oce and the level of eort exercised. Unlike in Ferejohn (1986) , voters in our model are not strategic; the voters do not take into account the eect 11 There are a few models that explore other aspects of politicians in the context of behavioral voting. Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2011) and Lizzeri and Yariv (2012) consider time-inconsistent voters. Achen and Bartels (2002) consider a model of two-candidate competition with uninformed voters. Their modeling approaches are substantively dierent than ours. of their behavior on the politician's incentive nor do they infer about politicians eort in a Bayesian rational manner. In spite of this, we conrm some of the comparative statics that are known in the electoral control literature and have been supported by empirical studies.
For example, higher values for holding oce (or lower cost of eort) improves electoral control, i.e. higher eort by elected ocials (e.g. Ferejohn (1986) and Ferraz and Finan 2009 ).
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In the next section, we dene the benchmark model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal eort choice of public ocials. Section 4 discusses the implications of the salience of extraneous events and voter memory. Section 5 explores some extensions of our model. It sheds light on the implication of correlated events, the frequency of elections, and recurring candidates. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
The model considers a innite series of periods. Dates are denoted by t ∈ N, although sometimes we will omit the date subscripts to simplify notions if no confusion arises from doing so. We assume for now that an election is held in every period. The candidates for the date t election are the incumbent from period t − 1, denoted θ t−1 , and a challenger γ t . θ 1 is determined exogenously. The electorate is comprised of a continuum (measure 1) of innitely lived voters. We will refer to a voter as "she"and the incumbent as "he". Voter i votes for θ t−1 at the date t election with probability (propensity) p i,t ∈ [0, 1]. We denote the vote share for θ t−1 at the date t election as P t =´i p i,t . We assume that θ t−1 is reelected if P t > 1 2 (i.e. majority rule). Otherwise the challenger γ t becomes the new incumbent θ t .
The winner of the date t election chooses eort a t ∈ {h, l} ⊂ R + , where one should interpret h as high eort (working for the electorate) and l as low eort (shirking). The incumbent's eort level at date t inuences the date t payo, π a i,t ∈ R for voter i, which in turn determines i'th propensity to reelect the incumbent (to be specied below). Date t utility for θ t is w −a t , where w is the value of holding oce. The incumbent chooses a (possibly nite) sequence of eorts to maximize his discounted utility with a discount factor δ < 1. We assume that w > h > l so the oce benets compensate for the incumbent's cost of eort. 12 The relationship between incentives, eort, and performance has also been studied in the context of term limits. Term limits are associated with lower eort, higher levels of corruption, and lower performance. While politicians are assumed to act as forward looking utility maximizers, voters respond to (past) payos in a myopic fashion. More specically, we assume that the voters follows an adaptive learning heuristic consistent with the Law of Eect. This heuristic is viewed as "the most important principle in learning theory (Hilgart and Bower, 1966; p. 481), and its key axiom is intuitive: agents increase the propensity for an action if that action has produced satisfactory feed-back, they decrease propensity if feed-back was negative. Feedback is satisfactory if current utility π a i,t exceeds a threshold π * . Formally,
We assume that i'th payo is correlated with the incumbent's eort by imposing that π a i,t = π a + i where π h > π * > π l are constants and { i } are iid random variables with median zero. 13 The random component i embodies extraneous events that are outside of incumbent's control but nonetheless aect voters decision (e.g. shark attacks, global oil price). For simplicity, we assume i contains no atoms and therefore the case of π a i,t = π * can be ignored.
We 
where β ∈ [0, 1]. Under the Bush-Mosteller rule, the next-period propensity is a convex combination of the current-period propensity and one if the payo is satisfactory, and zero if the payo is not satisfactory. It is straightforward to see (1) are satised. We assume that the propensity in the initial period is
Note that a higher β means that p i,t+1 depends less on p i,t , which is associated with payos prior to date t, and more on the date t payo. For example, in the case of β = 1, a voter's decision at date t + 1 depends only on the date t payo, i.e. voters are satiscers" 13 It will be clear in what follows that assuming { i } being identical is without loss of generality (see Appendix). The independence assumption is relaxed in Section 5.1.
as in Simon (1955). 14 Thus, β captures the voter's forgetfulness, or more generally their tendency to place greater weight on more recent experiences. By varying β, we can explore the relationship between forgetfulness and electoral control.
It is clear from equations (2) that two (probabilistic) events are of importance: π a i,t > π * and π a i,t < π * . We refer to the former as G(ood experience) and the latter B(ad experience). Dene Ψ a = Pr(π a i,t > π * ). From the incumbent's point of view, {Ψ h , Ψ l } are the only relevant properties of {π a i,t }, and the assumptions on π a i,t imply that Ψ h > 1 2 > Ψ l . Treating {Ψ h , Ψ l } as parameters, they can be interpreted as a measure of the amount of inuence of various types of extraneous events, or their salience. For example, an increase in the salience of negative events (i.e. events that hurt the incumbent) leads to a decrease in both Ψ h and Ψ l . Intuitively, the probability of a good experience for any level of eort would decrease if the voters pay greater attention to negative events. 15 Alternatively, if both positive and negative extraneous events become more salient, then both Ψ h and Ψ l would be close to 1 2 .
Intuitively, as voters pay attention to all types of extraneous events, the incumbent's eort choice becomes increasingly irrelevant and the dierence between Ψ h and Ψ l should decrease.
Electoral Control
We shall rst dene a few notions and terms for expositional purposes. Given the date t vote share P t and eort level a t , θ t 's vote share at the date t + 1 election is:
Note that the vote share dynamics share the same recursive structure as the underlying Bush-Mosteller process. Furthermore, when voter payo is deterministic (i.e. i is degenerate at 0 ), the vote share dynamic is exactly the Bush-Mosteller process (i.e. Ψ h = 1 and Ψ l = 0 ). Observe that our assumption of p i,1 = 1 2 implies that P 1 = 1 2 . 14 Originally developed in the context of search behavior, it has also been applied to models of voting (e.g. Bendor 2010, Bendor, Diermeier, Siegel, and Ting 2011). 15 Intuitively, if negative events are more salient, then the distribution of i is more spread out to the left of 0.
Observe that if P t is suciently large, then θ t can shirk and still be reelected. It is useful to distinguish whether an eort level ensures reelection or not. This leads to the following denition. Denition 3.1. An eort level a is adequate given P if Q(a, P ) > 1 2 . That is, a is adequate if under current-period vote share P, the incumbent will be reelected given eort a. Given current-period vote share P , a (possibly nite) sequence of action is adequate if eort at each subsequent date is adequate.
The following result is a direct consequence of (3):
is a adequate sequence of eorts, then so is any alternative sequence {a s } n s=1 where a s ≥ a s ∀s.
In many political systems an incumbent who loses a reelection rarely gets nominated by his own party to run for oce in the future. Therefore, we assume that θ t = γ t+s ∀s ≥ 0.
That is, the incumbent cannot become a challenger in the future after he is voted out. This essentially rules out strategic interaction between the incumbent and challengers. We will relax this assumption in Section 5.3. We will also assume that if the challenger wins the election, the propensity for the new incumbent is reset at 1 2 . In other words, the electorate is neutral towards a new incumbent. This is a reasonable assumption because in a context of moral hazard, reelection is a disciplining mechanism rather than a mechanism to select a competent leader as in an adverse selection context.
We can now characterize the optimal behavior of the incumbent. Lemma 3.2 below is a simple observation that at the optimum, the incumbent either exert sucient eort to remain in oce forever, or shirks and is voted out.
Lemma 3.2. At the optimum, θ 1 either shirks in the rst period and is voted out, or will remain in oce forever. Furthermore, if it is optimal for θ 1 to shirk in the rst period, then for all t > 1, θ t shirks as well.
From now on, we shall refer to the case where the incumbent stays in oce forever as "permanent incumbency". Lemma 3.2 implies that permanent incumbency is necessary for electoral control because otherwise the incumbent shirks every period. 16 We will henceforth take as given the optimality of permanent incumbency unless otherwise stated. Lemma 3.3 below states that permanent incumbency is optimal if the incumbent is suciently patient. 16 As we show in section 5.1 electoral control can be maintained in the absence of permanent incumbency in a more general setting.
Note that the critical value 1 − w−h w−l is decreasing in the reward from holding oce w and increasing in the cost of eort h and l.
To properly discuss electoral control, which is typically some measure of voters' long-run payo, we need to characterize the optimal sequence of eorts. Proposition 3.1 is an important step towards this goal. It shows that the optimal eort at date t follows a cut-o rule on P t . Moreover, we can explicitly compute the cut-o value P * from the parameters β and Ψ l . Interestingly, the cut-o P * is the lowest possible value of P t for which the incumbent can be reelected even if he shirks. Proposition 3.1. The incumbent chooses l at date t if and only if P t > P * where P * satises
then the optimal eort in every period is h; otherwise, l will be chosen innitely often at the optimum.
Since the vote share aggregates the voters' propensities, one may interpret P t as a measure of the incumbent's "political capital" at date t. Empirically, it may correspond to the incumbent's approval rating, as measured in public opinion surveys. Proposition 3.1 implies that incumbents do not seek to maintain public approval higher than necessary for reelection.
Rather, if public approval is suciently high, the incumbent will exploit his political capital and shirk.
Observe that the cut-o rule implies for P * > Ψ h , the incumbent exerts high eort every period; while for P * < Ψ l , eorts have a cyclical structure: a sequence of high eort followed by a sequence of low eort. The cut-o rule by itself, however, does not provide any characteristics of the eort cycles. This is accomplished by Proposition 3.2 below. Somewhat surprisingly, the length cycles are almost stationary, and we can derived bounds on the length of eort cycles. For notational simplicity, let Q a (P ) = Q(a, P ) and Q n a (P ) = Q a • Q a . . . • Q a n (P ).
> P * , then at the optimum, the incumbent chooses l for σ or σ + 1 consecutive periods each time after h is chosen, where σ = min{n : Q n l (Q h ( 1 2 )) ≤ P * } ≥ 1.
• If Q h ( 1 2 ) ≤ P * , then at the optimum, the incumbent chooses h for σ or σ +1 consecutive periods each time after l is chosen, where σ = max{n : Q n h ( 1 2 ) ≤ P * } ≥ 1.
Note that the length of consecutive high eorts (or low eorts) can dier between cycles. For example, the optimal sequence of eort may be something like {h, h, l, h, l, . . .} or {h, l, l, h, l, h . . .}, but the length of the cycles cannot dier by more than one.
Given eort level a, the one-period aggregate voter payo is´i π a i,t di. For simplicity, assume that i has mean zero and therefore´i π a i,t di = π a . Given a sequence of eort from the incumbent, one can compute the long-run aggregate voter payo, dened as:
We dened the long-run payo as the limit of means for notational simplicity. The results
would not change if we used discounted payos instead. Note that since the length of eort cycles is bounded at the optimum, the corresponding long-run voter payo, denoted Π * , is bounded as well. For example, if Q h ( 1 2 ) ≤ P * , then
A similar bound can be derived for the case of Q h ( 1 2 ) > P * . Note that the width of the bound is small for large σ, and therefore the bounds can be a good approximation for Π * .
We use the lower bound of Π * as the measure of electoral control. All of our comparative statics would follow if we used the upper bound instead. Denition 3.2. Let electoral control e be the lower bound of Π * , that is:
Observe that e is maximized (i.e. e = π h ) if the incumbent never shirks. Results in the next section shows that this can be accomplished under certain conditions. Therefore, electoral control with behavioral voters can be greater than the electoral control with rational voters as in Ferejohn (1986) , where there is always a strictly positive probability that the incumbent shirks. This observation is in contrast to the view that the public control of ocials does not function in an environment with an ignorant and uninterested public that relies on simple feed-back mechanisms. 17 
Election Characteristics and Electoral Control
In the previous section, we showed that public ocials will only accumulate sucient political capital to ensure reelection. From the voters' point of view, accumulating political capital should not be too easy. Otherwise, elected ocials will tend to exercise less eort.
With the characterization of eort choice, we can now explore the relationships between various model primitives and electoral control. We provide some novel insights. First, we show how the eect of some extraneous event on electoral control depend on whether the event is positive or negative. Second, we examine the consequence of voter's (lack of ) memory. Finally, we show that some of the known empirical regularities of electoral control also hold with behavioral voters. In particular, increasing in the value of oce helps electoral control. Throughout this section, since e is a strictly monotonic function of σ, we will often treat σ as electoral control to simplify notations in the proofs.
Extraneous Events
Extraneous events are events beyond the control of elected ocials that nevertheless impact Recall that the parameters Ψ h , Ψ l are interpreted as a measure the salience of extraneous events, or equivalently, the level of attention the voters pay to those events. As the salience 17 The popular press has engaged this issue in the context of "low information" voters, a term originally due to Popkin (1991) . As an example see the opinion piece by Berkeley cognitive linguist George Lako (Lako 2012) . Some political scientists have expressed similar opinions (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2004b; p. 38 ). of negative events increases, one should expect Ψ h and Ψ l to decrease. Intuitively, if voters pay more attention to negative extraneous events, then it depresses the probability of having a good experience for any given level of eort. Proposition 4.1 below shows that electoral control is decreasing in Ψ h and in Ψ l . Thus, it implies that electoral control is increasing in the salience of negative events, and decreasing in the salience of positive events. The eect of events that can be both positive and negative is ambiguous.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. If Ψ h is high, then it is easy for the politicians to build up political capital. This hurts electoral control because political capital encourages shirking. If Ψ l is low, then shirking is not very costly for the politicians, which clearly is harmful for electoral control. It follows that voters are better o, if they treat negative and positive events asymmetrically, giving more weight to negative rather than positive events. There is extensive evidence in the psychological literature that individuals 
Voter Memory
In this section, we explore a dierent dimension of electoral control: the connection between voter memory and electoral control. Recall our interpretation of β as a measure of voter's forgetfulness: a higher β means the current experience at time t has a greater weight on determining the date t+1 propensity than prior experiences. In the extreme case of satiscing (β = 1), the date t + 1 propensity is solely determined by the date t experience.
The following result indicates that a high level of electoral control is obtained when the voters are suciently forgetful. Intuitively, for a high level of forgetfulness, the incumbent's action at date t has a large impact on the outcome of election at t+1, but its impact on the outcome of election at t + 2, t + 3, . . . is small (since the outcome in those elections is aected mostly by actions in t + 1, t + 2, . . .). Consequently, the degree of voter forgetfulness determines how myopic or farsighted the incumbent is when choosing eort. And since for suciently large β, high eort is needed for reelection, a myopic electorate creates high incentives for the incumbent to exert high eort. It follows that electoral control is maximized in this case.
Proposition 4.2. e = π h if and only if β ≥
It then follows immediately that electoral control is maximized if voters are satiscers, as expressed in the following Corollary. In sum, we have shown that highly forgetful voters as identied by Achen and Bartels (2004a) can induce high levels of electoral control. However, as we will show in Section 5.2, this conclusion does depend on the frequency of elections. Highly forgetful voters induce the incumbent to behave myopically. This is benecial for electoral control when elections are frequent (i.e. held in every period). However, when elections are held once every k > 1 periods, a myopic incumbent would have little incentive to exert high eort except in periods close to an election. This suggests that highly forgetful voters decreases electoral control when elections are infrequent. We will discuss this issue in detail in Section 5.2. The proof is a striaghtforward given Lemma 3.3 and is omitted. Obseve that Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 imply that electoral control given permanent incumbency does not depend on w, h nor l. Thus, w and h − l aect electoral control only in determining the optimality of permanent incumbency. Finally, if there is a nite term limit, then the continuation value of exerting high eort is less than without term limits. It follows that the incumbent has a higher incentive to shirk, and electoral control suers. 18 18 For the impact on term-limits see Besley and Case (1995) 
The Value of Oce

Extensions
Common Shocks
We have so far assumed that the realization of shock i is independent across voters (i.e. idiosyncratic shocks). In reality, however, the experiences of voters can be correlated (e.g.
in the case macro-economic shocks). We can introduce common shocks into our model in the following manner. Suppose that in every period, all voters receive good experiences with probability p irrespective of the incumbent's eort, similarly, let q be the probability of all voters receiving a bad experience. The common shock is realized after the incumbent takes the eort. 2. if P * * < 1, then the incumbent chooses h if the reputation is such that Q(l, P ) ≤ P * * .
Interpreted literately, p + q is a measure of the frequency of the shock. An alternative interpretation of p+q is that it measures the proportion of voters aected by the shock. Thus, commonly experienced events that are suciently rare or eect a suciently small proportion of the electoral do not undermine electoral control. This applies to natural disaster (rare events) but also frequent events (e.g. football games) provided they are local in nature (in the sense that the outcomes are correlated among a comparatively small segment of the electorate). Indeed, as the second result in Proposition 5.1 shows, the presence of common shocks can improves electoral control. This follows from the fact that in the baseline model, high eort is exerted if and only if Q(l, P ) ≤ 1 2 , while here the threshold for high eort is P * * , which may be greater than 1 2 . Intuitively, the incumbent wishes to insulate himself against a bad shocks by maintaining higher political capital than in an environment without common shocks. Thus, he needs to exert high eort more often.
So far, we have shown that common shocks of limited impact have no eect on incumbent's behavior. However, there are some macro-events, for example oil price shocks in times of high volatility, that both reach a large portion of the electorate and can potentially occur with high frequency.
19 In our current setting, it is straightforward to see that if p + q is suciently large, then the incumbent would always shirk. Thus, these shocks can have a pernicious eect on electoral control. The intuition of this observation is as follows. If common shocks occur with high probability, then the incumbent's eort choice has only negligible eect on the outcome of the election. Therefore the incentive to undertake costly eort is small.
Multi-period Incumbency
In this section, we examine the incumbent's behavior when an election is held every k > 1 periods. That is, there is an election at date 1, k + 1, 2k + 1 and so on. Note that k = 1
corresponds to the baseline model in Section 2. We show that the optimal eort is still determined by a threshold rule even though the incumbent no longer needs to maintain a vote share of 1 2 in every period. This rule is stationary in the sense that threshold rule for date t will be the same as that for date t + k. To simplify notations, we will refer to dates t ∈ {τ, k + 1 − τ, 2k + 1 − τ, . . .} collectively as τ . That is, τ ≤ k is the number of period until the next election (e.g. τ = 1 denotes dates prior to an election, and τ = k denotes election dates. ) Proposition 5.2. At date τ, the incumbent maintains P τ > P * * τ and he shirks if and only if P τ > P * τ . where P * * τ and P * τ are dened as follows:
Note that oil prices uctuations, though reaching a large portion of electorate, can still be considered of limited impact if the uctuation is of small magnitude or occurs with low probability.
If β = 1,
Because P * * τ is decreasing in τ , P * τ is also decreasing in τ . Since P * τ is the threshold for shirking, this means that the incentive to shirk decreases as the election draws near (i.e. τ small). This is intuitive because when voters are forgetful, eorts early in the term have less impact on the outcome of the upcoming reelection. Furthermore, due to discounting, the cost of high eort is higher earlier in the term. These two factors imply that it is more protable for the incumbent to shirk early in the election cycle than late. Corollary 5.1 formalizes this intuition by showing that in the optimum, the incumbent shirks prior to some point in the election cycle and exerts high eort thereafter.
We also provide a bound on the proportion of high eorts to low eorts within an election cycle, and this bound is independent of k and decreasing in β. Corollary 5.1. There exists some 1 ≤ m ≤ k, such that for dates τ > m, the incumbent shirks and for dates τ ≤ m, the incumbent exerts high eort. Furthermore, there is an upper bound for m, denotedm, which is independent of k, decreasing in β, andm = m = 1 when β = 1.
Observe that the upper boundm can be translated to an upper bound on electoral control i.e. e ≤m k π h + k−m k π l . Now, sincem is independent of k, the bound on e is decreasing monotonically to π l as k increases to innity. This suggests that low frequency of elections is detrimental to electoral control. Moreover, the fact thatm is decreasing in β suggests that high forgetfulness is bad for electoral control when elections are infrequent.
Recurring Candidates
We have so far assumed that the incumbent cannot reenter a future election once he loses.
Consequently, the incumbent faces essentially a single agent optimization problem. In this section, we assume that there are two long-lived candidates (i.e. D and R ) who are ex ante identical and run against each other in every election (i.e. θ t−1 , γ t ∈ {D, R}∀t ). This is a reasonable assumption if we think of the candidates as political parties.
Thus, we have dened a non-cooperative game between two long-lived actors. Characterizing the Nash Equilibria of this game, however, is dicult, because the game lacks a recursive structure (the game is not a repeated game). Furthermore, the game may admit multiple equilibria (see Proposition 5.4 ).
We start with a straightforward observation:
then there is an equilibrium where permanent incumbency is achieved.
Clearly, if permanent incumbency is optimal in equilibrium, then θ 1 's optimal eorts on the equilibrium path are characterized as in the baseline model.
Uniqueness of equilibrium with permanent incumbency is possible under some parameter values.
Proposition 5.4. If δ > w−l w−h − 1 , then it is a dominant strategy for both players to follow the optimal sequence of eorts prescribed in Proposition 3.2.
Observe that the condition on δ in Proposition 5.4 is not the same in the condition in Ψ h −Ψ l , and δ ≤ w−l w−h − 1, then there is an equilibrium where both D and R always shirk. If, in addition, 1 − w−h w−l < δ, then there is also a permanent incumbency equilibrium.
Note that β ≥ Ψ h − 1 2 Ψ h −Ψ l is a sucient and necessary condition for maximal electoral control in the baseline model. Thus, Corollary 5.2 shows that in some instances, there can be two extremal equilibria: one in which the incumbent exercises high eorts in every period, and one in which the incumbent shirks in every period. This multiplicity of equilibria makes it dicult to conduct comparative statics. 20 However, it is straightforward to see that the 20 One problem is that for some equilibria, the measure of electoral control dened earlier (i.e. e) may not apply since the sequence of eorts on an equilibrium path may not be well-behaved. incumbent's payo under permanent incumbency must be the lower bound of the equilibrium payo, since the incumbent can always deviate to permanent incumbency. The fact that the incumbent's equilibrium payo is higher than under permanent incumbency suggests that there is (weakly) more shirking in equilibrium than under permanent incumbency. 21 This can be seen as evidence that allowing the incumbent to reenter the race after losing is harmful for electoral control. This is in accordance with a corresponding result in Ferejohn (1986) , where electoral control is decreasing in the probability that an incumbent returns to a race after losing oce.
Conclusion
Critics of democracy have frequently argued that democratic forms of governance require a well-informed and rational electorate (e.g. Dahl 1989 ). If voters are found to lack these qualities, so the argument continues, a proper justication for democratic governance is lacking (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2004b). Much of the existing debate on electoral accountability has centered on the question whether actual voter behavior is consistent with rational choice theory (e.g. Ashworth 2012) or not (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2004a) . In this paper, we set this debate aside and examine the implications of an electorate that follows simple behavioral rules rather than rational choice assumptions. That is, we assume that voters act as the behavioralist critics of the rational choice models have argued: they are forgetful, uninformed, biased and care little about politics and policy. We then build a model that captures these assumptions formally. The model yields a dynamic process which we analyze with respect to its predictive and normative properties.
Our model provides several novel insights. We nd that electoral control is increasing in the salience of negative events. In other words, electoral control is greater when voters pay greater attention to negative events. We nd that extraneous events that aect large proportion of voters and occur frequently are the most harmful to electoral control. We also show that the eect of voter forgetfulness depends crucially on the frequency of elections.
Voter forgetfulness is benecial to electoral control if and only if elections are frequent.
The upshot of our analysis is that one should be cautious about making broad statements regarding the implications of a behavioral electorate. Electoral control can function well even 21 Note that the incumbent obtains w in every period under permanent incumbency. Thus if in a given equilibrium both players were to obtain higher payos, that must mean l is chosen more often.
with voters that vote how they feel, who are forgetful and inuenced by extraneous events.
But the details matter. Voter forgetfulness, for example, may be a boon or bane for electoral control, depending on other institutional factors such as election frequency. Our modeling approach can also be applied to other questions. In addition to the factors identied in our analysis, one may consider the issue of candidate quality as in adverse selection models or the implications of policy choice under ideological candidates. Such questions, we hope, will be the subject of future research.
Appendix
Heterogeneous Ψ a In our model, we assumed that individual shocks { i } are drawn from the same distribution; this has the consequence that Ψ a is the same for all voters. The following result shows that this is without the loss of generality. Lemma 6.1. Let Ψ a i be the probability of a good experience occurring for voter i given eort level a, then the optimal incumbent behavior will be the same as in the environment where every voter is endowed with Ψ a =´i Ψ a i .
Proof. Note that the operator Q (i.e. next period's vote share given current period's vote share and eort) can be reformulated as:
Since the operator Q is the only relevant information for the incumbent's problem, we see that electoral control in an environment with heterogeneous Ψ a i is equivalent to an environment with homogenous voters.
Proof for Lemma 3.2
Proof. Let v(P ) be the incumbent's maximal discounted utility given vote share P ≥ 1 2 and him exerting high eort. Observe that v(P ) is increasing in P since an adequate sequence of eort under P will remain adequate under P > P . Suppose it is optimal for the incumbent to stay in the oce until date N > 1 and then quit, it must be that v(P N ) < w−l. By the fact that the incumbent is reelected at date N , P N ≥
This is a contradiction. Finally, if the vote share is 1 2
, l is not adequate. Therefore, if θ 1 shirks in the rst period, he will be voted out. Now, recall the assumption that when the challenger wins the election, a voter's propensity for the new incumbent is set at 1 2 . Thus the new incumbent faces the same decision problem as θ 1 . It follows that if it is optimal for θ 1 to shirk, then it is optimal for θ t>1 to shirk.
Proof for Proposition 3.1
Proof. It is straightforward to see that if P t ≤ P * , then the incumbent has to choose h, otherwise he will be voted out. We will now show that l will be chosen if P t > P * (note l is adequate if P t > P * at date t). Suppose at date t, the incumbent nds h optimal even though l is adequate. We can construct an alternative sequence of eorts that gives a higher payo.
There are two cases to consider. First, if a one stage deviation (i.e. play l at date t and then go back to the prescribed eorts) does not violate permanent incumbency, then clearly the incumbent is better o deviating. Suppose the one stage deviation violates permanent incumbency at t + s + 1 (i.e. the prescribed eort at date t + s after the deviation at t is no longer adequate), then we shall construct a two stage deviation where the incumbent takes eort l at date t , and takes eort h (instead of l ) at t + s. This two stage deviation gives a higher payo because of discounting. We need to show that this two stage deviation is adequate. The following observations are important for the proof.
Recall that Bush-Mosteller implies that given vote share P and eort level a, the vote share for the next election is Q(a, P ) = (1 − β)P + βΨ a . The dierence in vote share given the same P but dierent eort level is: (4) and the dierence in next-period vote shares between two dierent initial vote shares (P < P ) but the same eort is: Q(a, P ) − Q(a, P ) = (1 − β)(P − P ) by inductive reasoning, the dierence in vote share given P < P and taking the same vector of eorts {a 1 , a 2 . . . , a j } is:
(
Now, we are ready to show the two stage deviation is adequate. Note that after the rst deviation, l is prescribed at date t + s but is not adequate. By (4), the vote share at date t + 1 after the deviation is β(Ψ h − Ψ l ) less than under the prescribed sequence of eorts. Now, the one stage deviation is adequate at date t + s − 1, and by (5) , the dierence in vote share for the date t + s election between the one stage deviation and prescribed eorts at
, with s ≥ 1. Now, the second deviation has the incumbent taking h instead of l at the date t + s.
. Thus, the vote share at date t + s + 1 after the second deviation is higher than under the prescribed sequence of eorts. That means following the prescribed eorts from date t + s + 1 onward will not violate permanent incumbency. Now, since P 1 = 1 2 < Ψ h , incumbent's vote share at any given point cannot exceed Ψ h . Thus if the threshold is larger than Ψ h , the incumbent never shirks. If P * < Ψ h , then if incumbent exert high eort for many periods, the vote share will converge to Ψ h and therefore exceed P * at some point. It follows that the incumbent will shirk innitely often at the optimum.
Proof for Proposition 3.2
Proof. Assume rst that Q h ( 1 2 ) > P * . Since Q a (P ) is increasing in P , the incumbent's vote share following a high eort is larger than P * . Consequently, the incumbent shirks following a high eort according to Proposition 3.1. Now, the incumbent's vote share after exerting high eort is between Q h ( 1 2 ) and Q h (P * ). Therefore, the length of shirking is between min{n : Q n l (Q h ( 1 2 )) ≤ P * } = σ and min{n : Q n l (Q h (P * )) ≤ P * } ≥ σ. We will show min{n : Q n l (Q h (P * )) ≤ P * } ≤ σ + 1 by arguing that:
In particular, if we can show
then Lemma 3.1 will imply (6) .
Now, observe that P * − Q l (P * ) = P * − 1 2
Equation (7) and (8) imply that Q l (Q h (P * )) < Q h ( 1 2 ). Now, suppose that Q h ( 1 2 ) ≤ P * . Since at the optimum, the vote share is no greater than Q h (P * ), the vote share after l is between 1
Proof for Proposition 4.2
Proof. Observe that P * = 1 2 − βΨ l 1 1−β and the derivative
is strictly positive. Therefore, P * is increasing in β and P * → ∞ as β → 1.
Note that Q n a is a function of β as well. For the rest of the proof, let Q n (β) = Q n h ( 1 2 , β). Note that ∀β < β * , Q n (β) < Q n (β * ) < Ψ h , and P * → Ψ h as β → β * . Thus for β suciently close to β * , Q(β) < Q(β * ) < P * and by Proposition 3.2:
Now, we will argue that e is weakly increasing in β in an interval around β * . The idea is to show that for β suciently close to β * , dP * dβ (β ) is greater than dQ κ dβ (β ), where κ = e(β ). This ensures that e(β) = max{n : Q n ( 1 2 ) ≤ P * } is not decreasing in β. Writing Q n (β) explicitly, we have
Note that dQ n dβ is decreasing in β and that dQ n dβ → 0 as n → ∞. We know from above that dP * dβ is bounded away from zero, and κ can be made arbitrarily large by taking β suciently close to β * . Therefore, for suciently large β , dQ κ dβ (β ) < dP * dβ (β ).
Proof for Proposition 5.1
Proof. Note that there is always a positive probability of a series of consecutive bad shocks occurring, which implies that the incumbent is voted out even if he consistently exerts high eorts. Thus, the notion of permanent incumbency is no longer useful in the presence of common shocks .
For the rst result, note that if P * * ≥ 1, then the incumbent will be kicked out with probability q each period regardless of his eorts. Let P * be as dened in Proposition 3.1. If P ≤ P * , then the dierence in probability of reelection between high eort and low eort is 1 − p − q. Let v be the continuation value given high eort, the incumbent should choose high eort if δ · (1 − p − q) · v is greater than h − l. This is true if δ is large and q small, since v would be large in that case. Finally, it is straightforward to see that if P > P * , then the two stage deviation argument applies, and therefore l is optimal if P > P * .
For the second result, we have to argue that a suciently patient incumbent has a strict incentive to maintain his reputation above P * * . In particular, we want to show that the benet of exerting high eort when P is below P * * (i.e. an greater of probability of being reelected in the future) outweighs the loss of utility due to high eort. Let v P be the optimal discounted utility given reputation level P (note that v P is increasing in P ). Suppose P is such that Q(l, P ) ≤ P * * < Q(h, P ), then if the incumbent chooses h, he will have a higher probability of being reelected two periods from now than if he were to choose l (since the vote share next period will be above P * * ). Let this dierence in probability be , then he should choose h if δ · · v P > h − l where P is the next period's vote share given high eort (and no shocks occurring). Now, since w − h > 0, v P → ∞ as δ → 1 and p + q → 0. Therefore for suciently large δ and small probability of common shocks, high eort will be optimal. Now suppose P < P * * is such that Q(h, P ) = Q h (P ) < P * * < Q 2 h (P ), if the incumbent exert high eort, then given the step above, he will exert high eort again next period and his reputation will be above P * * after two periods (given no shocks occurring). Therefore, the incumbent's probability of being reelected three periods into the future will be higher if he exert high eort now rather than low eort. Again, for suciently patient incumbent and low probability of common shock, this dierence in probability is enough to induce high eort now. We can iterate the same argument for P where Q n−1 h (P ) < P * * < Q n h (P ) for any n.
Proof for Proposition 5.2 Proof. For β = 1, it is easy to see that the decision rule dened for maximizes the incumbent's utility. For β < 1, note rst that P * * τ represents the lower bound on reputation needed for permanent incumbency (i.e. if P τ ≤ P * * τ , then the incumbent cannot win the upcoming reelection even if he exerts high eort every period until the election). By the denition of P * τ , we see that if P * * τ < P τ ≤ P * τ , then the incumbent must exert high eort at τ , otherwise P τ −1 ≤ P * * τ −1 (dene P * * 0 = 1 2 ). Now, to show that for P τ > P * τ the incumbent would shirk, we can use a two-stage deviation argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 (keep in mind that Q(l, P τ ) > P * * τ −1 for P τ > P * τ , so shirking is adequate in such a case). We omit the details for brevity.
Proof for Corollary 5.1
Proof. First it is straightforward to see that when β = 1, the incumbent only has to exert eort in the period immediately preceding the election i.e. τ = 1. Thus, m = 1. Now, for β < 1, we will rst argue that if the incumbent exert high eort at date τ ≤ 2, then he will exert high eort at date τ − 1. In particular, we want to show that Q(h, P * τ ) ≤ P * τ −1 since this will imply that for any P * * τ < P τ ≤ P * τ , Q(h, P τ ) ≤ P * τ −1 , and by our characterization of the optimal action, the incumbent will exert high eort at τ − 1.
We shall show the following inequality holds:
Q(h, P * τ ) − P * τ ≤ P * τ −1 − P * τ Now, recall that (1 − β)P * τ + βΨ l = P * * τ −1 , and (1 − β)P * τ −1 + βΨ l = P * * τ −2 (where P * * 0 = 1 2 ).
Subtract the two equations, we get:
Now, since P * * τ −2 = Q(h, P * * τ −1 ) ,P * τ > P * * τ −1 and P * * τ −1 < 1 2 < Ψ h , it must be that Q(h, P * τ ) − P * τ ≤ P * * τ −2 − P * * τ −1 < P * τ −1 − P * τ We will denem = inf{n : Q n h (0) > 1 2 }. That is,m is the (smallest) number of consecutive high eorts that can guarantee reelection when initial reputation is 0. Thusm is an upper bound for m, i.e m ≤m. Observe thatm can be greater than k but does not depend on k. It is straightforward to see from the denition of Q(·, ·) thatm is decreasing in β and is equal to 1 when β = 1.
Proof for Proposition 5.3
Proof. Without the loss of generality, assume that θ 1 = D. Suppose for now that R adopts as his strategy the optimal sequence conditional on permanent incumbency. Given this, D faces the same problem as in the baseline model, which means that for δ large enough, it is optimal for D to stay in oce forever. This in turn justies the assumption of R's strategy.
Proof for Proposition 5.4
Proof. Suppose θ 1 = D, we will show that permanent incumbency is the dominant strategy for D. By symmetry, permanent incumbency is the dominant strategy for R as well. Observe that D's payo of an arbitrary strategy S and an arbitrary R's strategy is less than the payo of an appropriately chosen alternative strategy S and R shirking always. Since the D's payo under permanent incumbency is independent of R's strategy, showing that permanent incumbency dominates all other strategies when R always shirks is sucient to prove the dominance of permanent incumbency.
First, we will show that D's best response to R shirking always is either permanent incumbency or shirking always. The argument for this is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2. Let v P be D's maximal discounted payo given initial distribution P and choosing h. Letṽ be the D's maximal discounted payo for choosing l and losing the reelection. Note thatṽ does not depend on the initial distribution of propensities because the propensities for a newly elected incumbent is reset to 1 2
. Suppose the D's best response is staying until period N > 1 and then quit, it must be that v P N <ṽ. However, the fact that P N > P 1 and D chose h at date 1 means v P N ≥ v P 1 >ṽ. A contradiction.
Observe that if it is optimal for D to shirk at date 1, then it must be optimal to shirk whenever D is elected to oce. Thus, D's best response to R's strategy involves either permanent incumbency or shirking always. The payo associated with permanent incumbency is at least w−h 1−δ , while the payo associated with shirking always is w−l 
